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The Constitution and Our Debt to the Future
By Rena Steinzor1
ABSTRACT: Health and safety laws have always been justified as manifestations of
congressional authority to regulate and protect the free flow of interstate commerce under
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution. Professor Steinzor argues that reliance on the Commerce
Clause can support next generation proposals, including a National Environmental Legacy Act
proposed by Professor Alyson Flournoy, which would require that any action on federal land
involving the consumption or destruction of resources must be sustainable, as well as pending
climate change legislation. But, Steinzor says, a far more desirable constitutional foundation for
such laws is the General Welfare Clause found in Article I, section 8. The Commerce Clause has
the important deficit of focusing on commercial transactions between two entities now in
existence, while next generation laws must focus on the preservation of natural resources for us
by future generations not now in existence. Steinzor argues that the Supreme Court has long
recognized a state “police power” to protect public health and preserve the general welfare
outside the constricting context of commercial transactions. The Court could and should read
an analogous federal police power into the General Welfare clause given global threats such as
climate change. She locates her proposal in work on the concept of an affirmative constitution
by Professor Robin West, among others.
Part I: A New Breed of Public Law
Congress gave birth to the nation’s major federal environmental statutes during a period
of intense and extraordinarily fertile social upheaval, as America’s young people struggled to
reclaim their government and parents fought to recover their children’s respect. The first
generation of statutes, passed as the Vietnam War was winding down, launched a forty-year
revolution in the way Americans treat their environment. These statutes, amended and
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As I was midway through writing this chapter, I learned to my delight that its central thesis is not original. My
wonderful colleague, Tulane Professor Oliver Houck, proposed in a lecture at Pace University Law School that
environmentalists–especially those concerned about the preservation of natural resources—shift the historical
emphasis on the Commerce Clause to the General Welfare Clause for many of the same reasons I advance here.
Oliver Houck, Environmental Law and the General Welfare, 16 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1998-1999). I am also
grateful to my colleagues at the University of Maryland School of Law who helped me develop this proposal at one
of our aptly named “half-baked ideas” lunches, including Mark Graber, Robert Percival, Jana Singer, Max Stearns
Peter Quint, Bill Reynolds, Michael Van Alstine, and Greg Young. I also thank Alyson Flournoy, Catherine
O’Neill, Lisa Heinzerling, and Sidney Shapiro for their help and encouragement. Natalie Baughman, Ryan
Severson, and Limor Weizmann provided excellent research assistance.
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strengthened many times, propelled unprecedented advancements in pollution control and the
preservation of natural resources.
Yet somewhere along the line – it is difficult to pinpoint a single event or moment – this
progress began to unravel. We learned that the environment of our country was irrevocably
linked to the global environment and that frightening changes were underway in the atmosphere
as an overload of fossil fuel and other emissions disrupted the planet’s climate. The developing
world was intent on catching up with the United States and Europe economically but lacked the
regulatory infrastructure to moderate the impact of industrialization. The United States backed
away from global leadership on environmental issues because energy producers convinced
politicians that this role cost too much.
These fateful decisions could not have come at a worst time, as we are belatedly
beginning to realize. The world confronts accelerating climate change, an environmental crisis
that makes efforts to conquer previous challenges look like mere dress rehearsals. So much has
changed – globalization of business, invention of the worldwide web, discovery of the human
genome – and yet so much has remained the same – disillusionment with government, the false
dichotomy of jobs versus environment, the overpowering resistance of corporations to
regulation. We strain to find ways for our weakened government institutions – from Congress
to the president to the career civil service -- to steer the nation out of these blind alleys and back
onto the high road.
As the chapters in this volume argue, the reforms necessary to meet these grave
challenges must go “beyond environmental law” to a conceptual plane where even the most basic
and routine assumptions are revisited. To recreate the atmosphere of revolutionary change that
2
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gave birth to modern environmental protection, we must push beyond incremental tinkering.
New ideas must be incubated, embraced, enacted, and implemented.
The National Environmental Legacy Act (NELA) proposed by Professor Alyson
Flournoy in the first chapter of this book qualifies as such a breakthrough approach because it
would compel us to lengthen the temporal framework of decisionmaking into the indefinite
future and reject actions that would make humankind’s consumption of natural resources
unsustainable over that long run. NELA would prohibit any use of federally owned property
unless the full gamut of natural resources that exist on that land could be replenished in time for
future generations to use them. Activities on privately owned land that could destroy natural
resources on federal property would also be prohibited. Professor Flournoy proposes a fiftyyear time horizon for the evaluation of the activities covered by NELA, acknowledging that this
period is arbitrary and could be longer or shorter. However, she clearly considers this goal to
need constant refreshment, with sustainability reevaluated on an enduring basis through an
iterative cycle of decision-making.
Similarly, President Barack Obama and Democratic leaders in Congress have embarked
on an effort to pass climate change legislation centered on proposals to impose indefinite limits
on carbon emissions through a “cap and trade” system. 2 The system would either sell or give
legal permission to anthropogenic sources of “greenhouse gases” to emit a certain number of
tons each year. Such permission--also referred to as pollution “credits” or “allowances”--would
not be construed as property rights, at least by the legislature, and would be subject to a cap on
2

The White House, President Barack Obama, The Agenda: Energy and the Environment, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/energy_and_environment/ (visited on March 24, 2009); Patrick O’Connor,
“Waxman Makes Climate Change Mark,” Politico (March 9, 2009), available at
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0309/19768.html (visited on March 24, 2009).

3

Beyond Environmental Law: Policy Proposals for a Better Environmental Future, Alyson Flournoy and David
Driesen, eds. (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2010)
Chapter: The Constitution and Our Debt to the Future
April 11, 2009
Copyright 2009 by Rena Steinzor--Please do not cite, quote, or copy without express permission of author.

the total amount of annual emissions. Entities that possessed allowances could sell or otherwise
trade them to entities that do not. The system would exist indefinitely.
The context and ramifications of the activities that fall within NELA’s jurisdiction are
both larger and smaller than the policy choices we must make with respect to climate change.
Conceivably—although it is admittedly hard to imagine at this troubled juncture in human
affairs—we could reduce carbon emissions to the point that the worst consequences of climate
change are prevented. But even if we managed such a remarkable accomplishment, we would
still be left with the difficult job of preserving the sustainability of the natural resources covered
by NELA. In that sense, NELA is bigger than climate change regulation. Yet climate change
reductions must be garnered from sources located everywhere in the United States (and,
ultimately, the world), not just federal lands, and may well provoke more significant
realignments in the way people live than NELA would ever produce. In that sense, NELA is
smaller.
Regardless, both initiatives are sufficiently ambitious in scope and nature, and mark such
a giant step forward in the design of environmental law, that they raise some profound legal
issues. This chapter addresses the most fundamental question in American law: how should we
read the U.S. Constitution to justify these brave new breeds of environmental law? In a nutshell,
I argue that we should reexamine historical interpretations of Congress’ constitutional authority
to protect the environment. Instead of justifying federal intervention as a product of the national
government’s interest in fostering interstate commerce or guarding the government’s property
rights, these activities are better viewed as a manifestation of federal authority to safeguard and
promote the general welfare of the country and its populace.
4
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Federal environmental laws, along with all the other statute that assign the national
government a role over public health and safety, are assumed to be based on Article I, section 8
of the Constitution, commonly known as the “Commerce Clause,” which reads: “The Congress
shall have Power … To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes.”3 According to the dictionary, the word “commerce” has two
different meanings: its root definition is the “interchange of ideas, opinions, or sentiment
between individuals and groups in society,” but its most common usage is to describe the
“exchange or buying and selling of commodities.” 4 As Congress expanded the federal
government’s reach into areas of public law long dominated by the states, the Supreme Court
kept pace, broadening its interpretation of the Commerce Clause to encompass activity that could
potentially affect the economy, whether or not those activities actually involved the exchange of
money.5
This jurisprudence is arguably broad enough to encompass NELA and climate change.
NELA has additional constitutional support in Article IV, Section 3, giving the federal
government authority to manage land it owns.6 Why, then, cause trouble by proposing that we
would do better to look at other portions of the Constitution—specifically, the power to tax and
spend for the general welfare7--for authority to support new laws?

3

U.S. CONST., art. I, §8. The Constitution further states that “[a]ll legislative powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States.” U.S. CONST., art. I, §1.
4
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Unabridged) (Philip Babcock
Gove, Ph.D, and the Merriam-Webster Editorial Staff, eds.) (1993) at 456.
5
For a description of these developments, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES at 254-75 (3d ed.) (2006).
6
U.S. CONST., art. I, §3.
7
U.S. CONST., art. I, §8.
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Despite the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause to justify
federal intervention into most Americans’ daily activities, rooting environmental law in the
analysis of economic effects has constricted its growth to an unrecognized and corrosive extent.
The long-standing assumption that the pros and cons of environmental policy must be
rationalized in terms of money reached a point of diminishing returns about three decades ago,
with the militant application to cost-benefit analysis to regulatory decisions. Supporters of
America’s strong laws reacted instinctively to these developments by attacking that methodology
on its own terms. 8 But for perfectly understandably reasons, it did not occur to us to think
about whether our tacit acceptance of the Commerce Clause as the constitutional foundation for
environmental and other health and safety laws could be the genesis of these disheartening
developments.
This chapter begins an inquiry into the implications of those constitutional roots. At first
and maybe even at second blush, my reasoning will appear to push against the strong tide of
immutable constitutional theory when reformers of environmental law have much more pressing
and immediate work to do. But I am convinced that this apparently quixotic exercise is well
8

See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic
Reorientation, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 433 (2008); Douglas A. Kysar, Discounting . . . On Stilts, 74 U. CHI. L.
REV. 119 (2007); RENA I. STEINZOR, MOTHER EARTH AND UNCLE SAM: HOW POLLUTION AND HOLLOW
GOVERNMENT HURT OUR KIDS (Univ. of Texas 2007); Frank Ackerman, The Unbearable Lightness of Regulatory
Costs, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1071 (2006); David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Neutral?, 77 COLO. L. REV. 335
(2006) and Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety Protections: The Feasibility Principle, CostBenefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (2005); Robert R.M. Verchick, The Case
Against Cost-Benefit Analysis, 32 ECOLOGY L. Q. 101 (2005); FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS:
ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (New Press 2004); Catherine A. O’Neill,
Mercury, Risk, and Justice, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,070 (2004); THOMAS O. MCGARITY, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, &
DAVID BOLLIER, SOPHISTICATED SABOTAGE (Envtl. L. Inst., 2004); Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein’s Cost-Benefit Lite:
Economics for Liberals, 29 COLUMB. J. ENVTL. L. 191 (2004); Thomas O. McGarity, Professor Sunstein's Fuzzy
Math, 90 GEO. L. J. 2341 (2002); Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981
(1998) and The Rights of Statistical People, 24 Harv. ENVTL. L. REV. 189 (2000).
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worth the effort. The widespread tendency in recent years to employ economics as the primary
lens through which we justify health, safety, and environmental regulation has turned the
missions of the major environmental laws on their heads, compelling us to consider whether the
marketplace will address the problem, as opposed to whether and to what extent the government
has responsibility for protecting the public health and the environment.
Americans count on their government to prevent a growing number of international
disasters – from bird flu to global terrorism to water shortages –and do not conceive of these
protections as justified only with respect to “free market,” economic concerns. Not only did the
Framers of the Constitution recognize these expectations, they embraced them in Article 1,
Section 8, which authorizes Congress to “provide for the general Welfare” by taxing, spending,
and making all “necessary and proper” laws.9
I also argue that if commerce at its most fundamental level is comprised of the exchange
of commodities and money, then the term refers to a “marketplace” at a specific point in time.
Yet ideas like preserving natural resources for future generations or otherwise preventing
pollution that could harm our children and their children demand a significantly more attenuated
frame of temporal reference than has applied to the more immediate interventions that
characterize much of environmental law.
Part II of this chapter considers the implications of efforts by the judiciary and the
Executive Branch to apply the Commerce Clause to environmental law. Part III explains why
the General Welfare Clause, read in conjunction with the Constitution’s Preamble, could liberate
our search for breakthrough alternatives, drawing on precedents that support the exercise by the
9

U.S. CONST., art. I, §8.
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states of a “police power” to protect the public’s health. Part IV locates these ideas in the
scholarly literature that has developed the idea of an affirmative--or aspirational--Constitution.
Part II: The Commerce Clause, the Market, and Discounting the Future
A. Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court has embraced an expansive definition of Congress’ Commerce
Clause authority, keeping step with national political developments that expanded the federal
role in every aspect of domestic policy, beginning with the New Deal and reaching an apex in the
Vietnam War/Watergate era.10 The furthest reaches of the test ultimately developed by the Court
had two crucial elements: (1) the activities Congress sought to regulate could involve “noneconomic” transactions so long as (2) those activities had a “substantial” effect on interstate
commerce.11 The Court was more willing to curtail Congress when it perceived that the federal
government was manhandling the states. For example, it outlawed federal attempts to
“commandeer” state government resources in New York v. United States, a case involving the
siting of a low-level radioactive waste facility.12 But because all major environmental laws
afford the states the opportunity to volunteer to assume delegated authority to implement federal
regulatory requirements, and sweeten the deal with grants to support those state programs, New
York v. United States seemed to address an extreme example of federal overreaching without
much significance for the future.

10

For an excellent discussion of these developments in the context of environmental protection, see Robert V.
Percival, “Greening” the Constitution—Harmonizing Environmental and Constitutional Values, 32 ENVTL. L. 809
(2002) [hereinafter Percival].
11
See, e.g., Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942).
12
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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The 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez shook complacency about the federal
penchant for inventing elaborate regulatory programs and foisting them off on state agencies to
enforce. 13 The case involved a search for guns in a high school senior’s locker in order to
provide evidence for a criminal case under the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. In a
tense, 5-4 majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the Act had “nothing to do with
‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise” and that it did not contain any self-limiting
jurisdictional provision ensuring its limited application to activities that substantially affected
commerce.14 Justice Breyer’s dissent gave full-throated voice to the liberal justices’ view that
the opinion was a startling departure from precedent. Chiding the majority for shifting direction
on the Court’s long-standing and expansive definitions of commerce, he warned that its effort to
distinguish between “economic” and “non-economic” activity would not only create turmoil in
the lower courts, but also involve judges in second-guessing Congress in ways that exceeded
their appropriate constitutional role.15
Despite these warnings, the dissent’s supporters in the academy and in practice could
read Lopez as confined to federal incursions into the traditionally state-dominated realm of
criminal enforcement. They could reasonably argue that if Congress merely took the trouble to
include detailed “findings” in each new statute that specified how the conduct at issue would
substantially affect interstate commerce, it would satisfy the standards set out by the narrow
federalist majority on the Court.16 But the narrow conservative majority on the Court took

13

514 U.S. 549 (1995).
Id. at 561-62.
15
514 U.S. at 615-31.
16
I cheerfully made these arguments myself in Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Mandates and the “New (New)
Federalism”: Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REV. 97, 154-65 (1996).
14
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another swipe at the problem five years later in Morrison v. United States, striking down a statute
that gave battered women the right to bring tort suits in the federal courts. 17 This time, Congress
had minded its manners, making extensive findings regarding the adverse impact of gendermotivated violence on interstate commerce. Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and
O’Connor were not satisfied, holding that the Constitution imposes real limits on Congress’
Commerce Clause authority when “non-economic” activities such as assault are involved.18 This
conclusion demonstrates a serious intention to curb expansive federal regulation of purely
intrastate activities. As Professor Robert Percival has written:
Morrison thus raises the prospect that Congress cannot constitutionally regulate intrastate
activity that the Court deems noneconomic in character. This could mean that Congress
lacks the power to prohibit endangered species from being killed by activity that is not
characterized as economic in nature, such as recreational dirt-biking. 19
Dicta in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers (SWANNC)20 underscore these fears. Petitioners, a consortium of municipalities,
argued that they did not need to obtain a permit to fill wetlands located in an abandoned sand and
gravel pit because these sensitive areas were isolated from hydrological systems that crossed
state lines. Respondents, the Army Corps of Engineers, argued that the wetlands were habitat
for migratory birds that were pursued across state lines by millions of hunters and bird watchers
annually, establishing the required nexus with interstate economic activity under the Commerce
Clause. The Supreme Court majority (Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas)
expressed skepticism about the claim that people were pursuing the birds across state lines, but
17

529 U.S. 598, 700-701 (2000).
Id. at 613.
19
Percival, supra note 10, at 837.
20
531 U.S. 159 (2001). The Fourth Circuit has gone as far as to declare that Commerce Clause authority does not
extend to isolated wetlands. United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997).
18
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decided to avoid extending its constitutional precedents. Instead, they decided the case on the
grounds that the Clean Water Act itself excluded so-called “isolated” wetlands from its
jurisdiction—a concept that imagines boggy land where no boat can travel as removed from
other hydrological systems that cross state lines, despite extensive evidence that connections
beneath the land’s surface are much more extensive than the casual observer imagines.21 The
possibility that the migratory birds could land on these patches of land was not sufficient to
demonstrate that the bogs came within the statute’s jurisdiction.
Despite this reliance on statutory interpretation, the majority could not resist taking a
swipe at expansive readings of the Commerce Clause: “Where an administrative interpretation of
a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that Congress
intended that result.”22 The dissent (Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer) disagreed, first on
statutory and then on constitutional grounds: “The power to regulate commerce among the
several States necessarily and properly includes the power to preserve the natural resources that
generate such commerce.”23 Environmentalists widely perceived the case and its close
successor, Rapanos v. U.S., as disasters that gutted Clean Water Act wetlands protections
because it pinned the Army Corps and other federal officials down in lengthy deliberations of
whether wetlands were “isolated” or not.24 The grave constitutional implications of the decision
remain unclear, although Congress is considering legislation to broaden the Corps’ jurisdiction.25

21

Id. at 171-72.
Id. at 172.
23
Id. at 196.
24
547 U.S. 715 (2006).
25
Linda Roeder, Clean Water Act: Jurisdiction Over Wetlands, Infrastructure, Stormwater Runoff Top Agenda
This Year, 40 ENVTL. REP. 24 (2009).
22
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The outcome of the 2008 presidential election suggests that the conservative Supreme
Court justices who have led these assaults on Commerce Clause jurisprudence are unlikely to
muster a majority for further campaigns. Without the votes, their enthusiasm for the arduous
work of re-aligning the large body of Commerce Clause precedent to include only demonstrably
economic effects is likely to fade. As Justice Souter’s dissent in Morrison noted, any effort by
the Court to craft clear rules distinguishing economic from noneconomic behavior, much less
behavior that has ramifications intrastate from behavior that has ramifications interstate, is
fraught with peril.26 Justice Souter reminded his colleagues of the Court’s misadventure in
National League of Cities v. Usery, where another narrow majority attempted to distinguish
between “traditional state functions” and instances where states behaved more like commercial
actors, spawning 300 incoherent decisions by the lower federal courts. 27 The chaos so alarmed
Justice Blackmun that he switched his vote only nine years later, holding with a similarly narrow
majority in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority that Congress was well within
its Commerce Clause authority when it regulated the labor conditions of state and local
workers.28
The likelihood that the Supreme Court will pass on an opportunity to advance the
Morrison holding should deter the lower federal courts from pursuing such campaigns, although
the significant cadre of conservative judges on appellate panels could decide to raise the issue in
an appropriate case regardless of their chances to persuade a majority of Supreme Court justices
to follow suit. Such strange things have happened. Consider, for example, the D.C. Circuit’s

26
27
28

529 U.S. at 700-701 (2000)
426 U.S. 833 (1976).
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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effort to invoke the “non-delegation doctrine” to slap down the Environmental Protection
Agency’s (EPA) efforts to tighten regulation under the Clean Air Act.29 That doctrine had lain
dormant for decades until a group of enterprising conservative Supreme Court practitioners
decided to revive it in something of a “hail Mary” pass before a very conservative panel. The
panel’s decision to take them up on this suggestion left the impression that it was daring the
Supreme Court to take a huge step to the right rather than crafting a workmanlike precedent.
Ultimately, the Court dismissed the challenge out of hand, voting 8-0 to uphold the EPA
regulations.30
Were conservative judges to go on a hunt for constitutional reasons to reverse either
NELA or climate change legislation as exceeding Congress’ Commerce Clause authority, they
would probably argue that the portions of the legislation that seek to protect a legacy for future
generations lack any rational basis under the Commerce Clause because the intended
beneficiaries—natural resources and lives not yet extant—have no current “economic” or
market-based value in the context of interstate commerce. No one alive today can engage in
transactions—commercial or noncommercial--with beings not yet in existence. Congress
therefore lacks any authority to burden the present with this imaginary debt to the future. This
logic, however, would compel the courts to lift their black robs high in order to take the leap
from the frying pan into the fire. Parsing the temporal dimensions of federal statutes in order to
ensure that it only benefits people alive today, and then only in an economic way, are exercises
that make earlier debates look like child’s play.
B. Property Clause
29
30

Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. U.S. EPA, 175 F. 3d 1027 (1999).
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
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The Constitution grants Congress explicit authority to control what happens on federal
lands stating, in Article IV, Section 3 that it “shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States;
and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United
States, or of any particular State.” 31 To the extent that NELA required managers in the
Executive Branch to conserve natural resources owned by the federal government, this clause
would be the beginning and end of any debate over the proposal’s constitutionality. But
guaranteeing the sustainable use of federally owned natural resources would require two crucial,
additional steps: (1) terminating or placing conditions on mineral leases, grazing permits, or
similar extraction agreements that allow private parties to exploit such resources32 and (2)
controlling the use of non-federal land if the activity would make achievement of NELA’s
mandates impossible. The complex issues involved in curtailing or revoking federal leases are
beyond the scope of this chapter. In the second set of circumstances, a broader search for
constitutional authority would be necessary.
C. Cost-Benefit Analysis
1. The “Spend-down Ethic”
Most practicing lawyers are content to leave debates over constitutional interpretation to
the academy; they pick up on the law as it comes out of courts or legislatures, rarely examining
its constitutional roots. Legislators likewise spend little time second guessing their assumptions
of constitutional authority, except when presented with the argument that they are abridging

31

U.S. CONST., art. IV, §3.
See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (invalidating the federal Kohler Act on due process
grounds for allowing the government to take private mineral rights without just compensation).

32
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individual rights. The body politic debates guns, abortion, the First Amendment, and the
occasional search and seizure. On such relatively rare occasions, legislators chide their
colleagues with the prediction that a proposal will fail constitutional muster. But the core
rationale for any law—the affirmative reasons why it represents an appropriate exercise of
legislative authority under the Constitution—are seldom mentioned on the House or Senate floor.
Despite this dearth of explicit references, the way the Constitution frames a problem has
profound effects on the way legislation and its implementation are perceived. Questions about
the appropriate dimensions of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause may reach the
public in deep disguise, but clearly involve disputes over which level of government should
control the marketplace and the expenditure of money. Should the federal government be able to
impose “unfunded mandates” on state and local governments? Is it acceptable for a town to bar
the disposal of out-of-state waste at the local landfill? Which level of government was at fault
for the damage caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and which officials should plan and pay
for recovery? Even Katrina—a natural disaster of unparalleled proportions that most closely
resembled war in its consequences for the civilian population—required a federal response not
because of any officially articulated constitutional obligation to save lives or provide succor to
devastated communities but rather because the national government has the authority to limit the
effects of events that shake the foundations of commerce.
From this broader perspective, we can discern Commerce Clause ideas as the fault lines
that dog any environmental dispute. Reliance on the federal authority to promote marketplace
vigor sets the stage for the supposed trade-off between jobs and the environment and between
public health and prosperity. Democrats insist that we can find better ways to protect the
15
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environment, therefore sacrificing less economic growth.33

Republicans claim that

environmental regulations waste money, stifle small business, and cripple the nation’s
competitiveness.34 The common ground for both arguments is the view that environmental
protection and the economy are in a relationship that demands their trade-off against one another.
If the constitutional authority for environmental regulation rests on protecting commerce and
markets, then weighing costs against monetized benefits appears to be both logical and
inevitable.
To gauge the importance of these assumptions, consider for a moment the arguments that
would be made by people who oppose the idea of codifying an obligation to conserve resources
for future generations. The proposition that we owe resources, much less specific amounts of
money, to future generations, is likely to prove exceptionally controversial. In fact, opponents
will argue, when we enhance monetary wealth by consuming resources, we provide the
economic resources needed by future generations to buy their way out of any irreversible
environmental trouble. Or, to phrase the argument another way, resources in and of themselves
have no value until they are bought and sold. Refraining from buying and selling them has
absolutely nothing to do with encouraging the promotion of commerce, which the national
government has always done by stabilizing markets, not by enforcing fanciful prohibitions
against market transactions.
33

U.S. EPA, SUMMARY REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: THE PRESIDENTIAL REGULATORY REFORM INITIATIVE BY THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, reprinted in 1995 DAILY ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 121 (June 23, 1995) ("We
have learned that by focusing on results, not on how results are achieved, we can tap the creativity of Americans to
devise cleaner, cheaper, smarter ways of protecting the environment.")
34
For an admittedly extreme, but not a-typical, example, consider Congress Tom DeLay’s comparison of the EPA
to the Gestapo. Bruce Burkhard, “Year in Review Congress vs. Environment: Environmental Laws Suffer under
GOP-Controlled Congress,” Cable News Network, Dec. 29, 1995,
http://www.cnn.com/EARTH/9512/congress_enviro/. An audio recording of Congressman DeLay’s comments is
available through the online version of the article.
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Professor Flournoy refers to these arguments as the “spend-down ethic,” explaining that
they implicitly reject any moral or ethical commitment to preserve resources for future
generations. Instead, this ethic posits that ownership of resources and control over how rapidly
they are consumed are the sole prerogative of those now living on the planet.35 Under Professor
Flournoy’s analysis, unless we take decisive action to fundamentally modify our patterns of
consumption, the spend-down ethic will win the day. And it is very hard to articulate an
economic reason for making ourselves so uncomfortable.
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis and Discounting
The application of cost/benefit analysis to environmental decisions became mandatory
during the administration of Ronald Reagan, carried through the presidency of George H.W.
Bush, two terms of the Clinton Administration, and two terms of the George W. Bush
Administration.36 President Obama has appointed Harvard Professor Cass Sunstein as director
of the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA), the unit charged with enforcing this methodology throughout the government, and he is
expected to continue the practice. To be sure, the four administrations applied cost-benefit
analysis with significantly different levels of stringency. But as the methodology took hold, and
its practitioners became more sophisticated, it loomed as the central hurdle regulatory proposals
had to traverse.
35

INSERT REFERENCE TO FLOURNOY CHAPTER.
President Reagan issued Executive Order 12291 in 1981. Executive Order no. 12,291, Federal Register 46
(February 17, 1981): 13193, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12291.html.
Executive Order 12866, which replaced 12291, was first issued under President Clinton, and was continued by
President Bush without amendment until January 18, 2007, when it was supplemented by Executive Order 13422.
Executive Order no. 12,866, Federal Register 58 (Oct. 4, 1993): 51735, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
inforeg/eo12866.pdf; Executive Order no. 13422, Federal Register 72 (Jan. 23, 2007),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070118.htm.
36
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Under cost-benefit analysis, economists place a monetary value on—or “monetize”—the
anticipated compliance costs of firms that must comply with a regulation. They also monetize
“lost opportunity costs,” or the money businesses will lose if they cannot invest those
compliance costs. The total of these sums is compared to the monetary value of the benefits that
the regulation would produce. So, for example, economists estimate that the monetary value of a
single life saved is between $2.5 and 6.8 million.37 The gist if these calculations, then, is to
make the trade-offs at stake in any regulatory decision—to protect or not to protect? how
stringently to protect?—resemble a commercial transaction.
Strong deterrents against the full consideration of harm to future generations are
embedded as irrefutable elements in the daily practice of cost-benefit analysis, chiefly because
also economists insist on “discounting” the value of injury avoided. They reason that many
regulations do not save lives immediately. I may die in a car crash tomorrow that would have
been prevented by a safety rule, but if I am exposed to a chemical compound and get cancer, I
will not die for 30 years. In calculating the benefits of saving my life in 30 years, then, we
should figure out how much money we would have to invest today to come up with the going
rate for a life saved in 30 years. The OMB recommends that agencies use discount rates of three
to seven percent to define a range for their discounted benefit calculations.38 Obviously,

37

THOMAS O. MCGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE FAILED PROMISED OF THE OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 271 (1993).
.
38
The OMB justified discounting in its guidance on how to conduct cost/benefit analysis for all federal agencies
U.S. OMB, Circular A-4 at 31-37 (September 17, 2003) [hereinafter Circular A-4], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ circulars/a004/a-4.pdf. For a critical explanation, see Lisa Heinzerling,
Discounting Our Future, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 39 (1999). For a justification of using discounting to quantify
long-term benefits, albeit at a significantly lower rate than is commonly used by the federal government, see Daniel
A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the
Environment, 46 VANDERBILT L. REV. 267 (1993).
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discounting results in substantially decreasing the benefits of a rule that prevents such “long
latency” injury. I must invest a much smaller sum today to come up with a much bigger sum at
the end of 30 years. If the benefits are stretched out to 50 or 100 years, and cover lives saved of
people who are not year alive, the investments required today dwindle to insignificance.
Discounting, to put it mildly, is a major hurdle for any effort to justify regulations under the
National Environmental Legacy Act in cost/benefit terms.
OMB economists are untroubled by these outcomes, although they acknowledge that
such situations raise “special ethical considerations.”39 After all, “[f]uture citizens who are
affected by such choices cannot take part in making them, and today’s society must act with
some consideration of their interests.”40 Nevertheless, the economists argue that discounting
should remain an integral part of cost-benefit analysis because future generations will be
wealthier than we are today. Using a lower discount rate or otherwise giving future generations
an economic advantage would therefore take money away from poorer people today to benefit
people who will be richer tomorrow.
All of these problems with cost-benefit analysis are compounded by the fact that efforts
to quantify the value of natural resources, from the grizzly bear to the polar ice caps, are
rudimentary at best.41 Problems of causation are fierce. Is an adequate supply of potable water
in the Seattle metropolitan area worth enough (discounted) money to our grandchildren’s
children to justify our investment in sustainable wetlands management in Mount Baker39

Circular A-4, supra note 38, at 35-6.
Id.
41
See, e.g., the National Capital Project, a cooperative venture of The Nature Conservancy, the World Wildlife
Fund and the Woods Institute for the Environment at Stanford University, summarized at
http://www.naturalcapitalproject.org/california_prim.html. The Project began in 2006 with the goal of determining
“what is nature worth to people?” It has made limited progress.
40
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Snoqualmie National Forest? The link between managing wetlands and producing potable water
is already a scientifically complex question. Quantifying the value of each in a decades-long
timeframe is guesswork at best.
Proponents of cost-benefit analysis might well reply that we must simply bite the bullet
and assume the burden of gathering such information. How else should we determine whether
we should spend lots of money today when future generations may well be able to afford to work
their way around the dearth of natural resources?
The ultimate answer to this apparently reasonable question is that the most scrutinized,
vetted, peer reviewed, and expensive body of scientific evidence ever gathered by the human
race proves that unless we take swift action to change our conduct--and perhaps even if we do-we will destroy essential natural resources to the point that they will never be available to our
children’s children, much less our grandchildren’s grandchildren. No matter how much money
future generations may have, crucial resources will not be on the market because they will not
exist.
3. The Irreversible Effects of Climate Change
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is the most exceptional
organization of scientific expertise in history. Founded in 1988 by two U.N.-sponsored
organizations, the World Meteorological Organization and the Environment Programme, it now
includes over 3,000 scientists worldwide who study every conceivable aspect of climate change,
from meteorology to geology to hydrology to anthropology. The IPCC does not conduct
scientific research, but instead reviews, synthesizes, and interprets existing and emerging
research, much of which is being conducted by its individual members. The IPCC is divided into
20
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four working groups and operates by consensus, achieving unanimous agreement to the text in its
published reports, which are commonly referred to as “assessments.” The assessments are
strictly limited to objective statements about the state of science, as opposed to policy issues or
conclusions. While some scientists continue to quibble at the margins of the conclusions
presented in these voluminous reports, credible alternative research disputing the IPCC’s core
conclusions--the most fundamental of which is that the use of fossil fuel has triggered potentially
catastrophic climate change--simply does not exist.
In 2007, Working Group I, which focuses on the physical science basis for observations
and predictions regarding climate change concluded: “Warming of the climate system is
unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean
temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising global average sea level.”42 The
scientists continued, “The globally average surface temperature is projected to increase by 1.4 to
5.8ºC over the period 1990 to 2100, with nearly all land areas warming more rapidly than the
global average.”43 As a result, “It is very likely that hot extremes [and] heat waves…will
continue to become more frequent.”44
Working Group II, which focuses on impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability, concluded
that same year: “Observations since 1961 show that the average temperature of the global ocean

42

RICHARD B. ALLEY ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 5 (Susan Solomon ed., Cambridge
University Press 2007) [hereinafter ALLEY], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4wg1-spm.pdf.
43
ROBERT WATSON ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE: CLIMATE CHANGE AND
BIODIVERSITY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE TECHNICAL PAPER V 10 (Habiba Gitay ed.,
2002) [hereinafter WATSON]. available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/technicalpapers/climate-changes-biodiversityen.pdf.
44
ALLEY, supra note 42, at 15.
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has increased to depth of at least 3000 m and that the ocean has been absorbing more than 80%
of the heat added to the climate system. Such warming causes seawater to expand, contributing
to sea level rise.”45 As a result, “Many millions more people are projected to be flooded every
year due to sea-level rise by the 2080s. Those densely-populated and low-lying areas where
adaptive capacity is relatively low, and which already face other challenges such as tropical
storms or local coastal subsidence, are especially at risk.”46
Climate change will have a severe effect on the diversity and survival of a wide range of
species: “Approximately 20-30% of plant and animal species assessed so far are likely to be at
increased risk of extinction if increases in global average temperature exceed 1.5-2.5°C [medium
confidence].”47 The IPCC continued, “While there is little evidence to suggest that climate
change will slow species losses, there is evidence that it may increase species losses… Many of
the Earth’s species are already at risk of extinction due to pressures arising from natural
processes and human activities. Climate change will add to these pressures especially for those
with limited climatic ranges and/or restricted habitat requirements.”48
A comprehensive recitation of these disturbing projections is well beyond the scope of
this chapter. Suffice it to say that this indisputable science should cast grave doubt on the
wisdom of micro-cost/benefit analyses of specific actions that are conducted on the premise that
future generations will be able to buy their way out of trouble. Not only does discounting at the
45

Id.at 5.
NEIL ADGER ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO
THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 12 (Martin Parry ed.,
Cambridge University Press 2007) [hereinafter ADGER], available at available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf.
47
Id. at 11.
48
WATSON, supra note 43, at 16.
46
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micro-level appear myopic, the sum total of its results is likely to lead us to the same place that
scientists have been warning against with increasing urgency: inaction in all but the most
grotesquely imbalanced circumstances when the greed of present generations will wipe out the
survivability of future generations on a grand scale. In the big picture, aggregating all of our
natural resource use, we are already there. By fracturing this larger picture into millions of small
shards, we justify business as usual, which we can ill afford.
4. Cultural Values
Of course, putting the Commerce Clause to one side for a moment, it should be obvious
that many Americans harbor the value that we must protect future generations or, conversely,
that we owe it to our children and their children not to pass on a planet in peril. The most
articulate statements of these values arise from the religious community. In 2004, the National
Association of Evangelicals adopted a groundbreaking statement entitled “For the Health of the
Nation,” which declared seven principles that should guide the participation of its members in
the formulation of public policy. The Association is the largest evangelical organization in the
country, with over 45,000 churches, 60 evangelical denominations, and 30 million members.
Under the heading “We Labor to Protect God’s Creation,” the drafters state:
We affirm that God-given dominion is a sacred responsibility to steward the earth
and not a license to abuse the creation of which we are a part. . . This implies the
principle of sustainability. . . Because clean air, pure water, and adequate
resources are crucial to public health and civic order, government has an
obligation to protect its citizens from the effects of environmental degradation.
This involves the urgent need to relieve human suffering caused by bad
environmental practice. . . We encourage Christians to shape their personal lives
in creation-friendly ways: practicing effective recycling, conserving resources,
and experiencing the joy of contact with nature. We urge government to
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encourage fuel efficiency, reduce pollution, encourage sustainable use of natural
resources, and provide for the proper care of wildlife and their natural habitats.49
This passionate commitment has come to be called “creation care.”
The Constitution, as amended by the Bill of Rights, and its companion document, the
Declaration of Independence, embody ethical values that are at the core of Aerican culture.
These values extend far beyond the ministerial, albeit important, responsibility to preserve
commerce between the states. Yet the Commerce Clause is invoked-- tacitly by the body politic
and explicitly by the courts—to justify the vast range of federal interventions in American life,
from social welfare programs to the environment to the protection of public health. Should we
turn our backs on these inconsistencies, or is there another constitutional foundation for a more
ethical middle ground?

Part III: Safeguarding the General Welfare
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty for ourselves and our Posterity, do
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.50
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to
pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United
States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.51
A. The States’ Police Power
The argument that the federal government’s efforts to deal with long-term threats to
public health and the environment should be lifted from the constraints of the Commerce Clause
49

DAVID P. GUSHEE, THE FUTURE OF FAITH IN AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PUBLIC WITNESS OF THE EVANGELICAL
CENTER 233-4 (Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2008).
50
U.S. CONST., Preamble.
51
U.S. CONST., art. I, §1.
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and placed under the umbrella of the national government’s efforts to promote the “general
welfare” is best supported by the Supreme Court’s confirmation of the states’ “police power” to
combat comparable threats. At the time of the American Revolution, this concept was captured
in the Latin phrase “salus populi supreme lex est,” or “the safety of the people is the supreme
law.” States have a long and noble history of regulating practices that could threaten public
health, beginning as early as the 1700s when smallpox inoculations were common in the New
England colonies, extending through the sanitarian movement in America’s major cities during
the late 19th and early 20th centuries, covering the campaign to eradicate polio during the 1950s,
up until the present day when the threat of AIDs has challenged their capacity to the breaking
point.52
The Slaughter-House cases decided by the Supreme Court in 1872 typify this
jurisprudence.53 At issue was a Louisiana law granting a monopoly to a single slaughterhouse on
the grounds that it would be easier to control the practices that led such places to spread disease
through the careless disposal of animal carcasses and other wastes. The Court treated the case as
a showdown between state police power prerogatives and the recently enacted 14th Amendment
grant of “privileges and immunities” to citizens of the United States—in this instance, the chosen
slaughterhouse’s competitors and their privilege to continue in business. 54 Owners of competing
slaughterhouses challenged the law, alleging that their “privileges and immunities” were violated
52

For a compelling explanation of the history of public health law, see Wendy E. Parmet, From Slaughter-House to
Lochner: The Rise and Fall of the Constitutionalization of Public Health, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HISTORY. 476 (1996)
[hereinafter Rise and Fall] (focusing on the full sweep of historical developments from colonial times, thorough the
New Deal, to the present) and Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and the Role of
the State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 267 (1992-1993) [hereinafter Health Care and the
Constitution] (considering especially the Framers’ expectations about the role of the government with respect to
public health during colonial times).
53
83 U.S. 36 (1872).
54
U.S. CONST., amend. XIV.
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by the state’s grant of a monopoly to a competitor. In response, the Supreme Court cited the
“power here exercised by the [Louisiana] legislature,” which “in its essential nature” has always
belonged to the states.”55 The Court continued:
This is called the police power: and it is declared by Chief Justice Shaw that it is much
easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of it than to mark its boundaries,
or prescribe limits to its exercise. … Upon it depends the security of the social order, the
life and health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated
community, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property. 56
The Slaughter-House cases established the premise that the states are presumed to have broad
police powers and that the question for the federal courts is whether they had gone too far in
exercising it. But the strength of this holding weakened over time both because the state law at
issue came to be viewed as a cynical exercise in post-Reconstruction patronage and because the
threat of epidemics and other urgent public health emergencies waned.
Once the urgency and barely contained terror of cholera and similar diseases was brought
under control by better sanitation and medical breakthroughs such as vaccination, state public
health officers turned to what Professor Wendy Parmet calls “endemic” threats to public health,
such as working conditions and occupational exposure to harmful substances.57 The federal
courts balked, largely because these new targets provoked state efforts to control industrial
practices, considered anathema from the late 1800’s to the New Deal. The low point in this
jurisprudence was the Supreme Court’s 1905 decision in Lochner v. New York58 overturning the
state of New York’s efforts to control the hours that bakers were allowed to work. Despite the
dissent’s citation of ample evidence demonstrating the severe harm to bakery workers caused by
55
56
57
58

Id. at 61.
Id. at 61.
See Rise and Fall, supra, note 52, at 493-501.
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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exposure to flour dust, intense heat, and long hours of work in a standing position,59 the Court
refused to even recognize the state law as an exercise of police power, instead dismissing it as a
“labor law” that interfered with the constitutional right of freedom to contract.60
As the New Deal era unfolded, World War II was fought and won, and America settled
into the post-industrialization era, the Supreme Court repudiated Lochner in a series of decisions.
But these cases stopped mentioning the police power and were instead rationalized as federal
deference to the states’ prerogatives. For example, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish61 upheld a
Washington statute requiring that women be paid a minimum wage, holding that
[i]n dealing with the relation of employer and employed, the Legislature has necessarily a
wide field of discretion in order that there may be suitable protection of health and safety,
and that peace and good order may be promoted through regulations designed to insure
wholesome conditions of work and freedom from oppression.62
Similarly, in Day-Brite Lighting v. State of Missouri, the Court upheld a Missouri statute
allowing workers to be absent from their places of employments for four hours between the
opening and closing of election polls:
Our recent decisions make plain that we do not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the
wisdom of legislation nor to decide whether the policy which it expresses offends the
public welfare. … [T]he state legislatures have constitutional authority to experiment
with new techniques; they are entitled to their own standard of the public welfare; they
may within extremely broad limits control practices in the business-labor field, so long as
specific constitutional prohibitions are not violated and so long as conflicts with valid and
controlling federal laws are avoided.63
In a series of articles notable as much for their careful study of history as their insightful
constitutional analysis, Professor Parmet argues that this reluctance to expand the concept of a
59
60
61
62
63

198 U.S. at 70-71.
198 U.S. at 57.
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
300 U.S. 379, 392 (1936).
342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).
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police power to include widespread and chronic threats to public health, especially where
workers were involved, served to “deconstitutionalize” public health law. The phrase “salus
populi supreme lex” was dropped from judicial lexicon, and the Supreme Court “abandoned the
quest for the boundaries between the public and private spheres of authority.”64 No one
lamented this subtle shift at the time, in large measure because state and federal legislatures were
given ample running room by the courts to enact all manner of public health programs, from
wage and hour laws to occupational safety laws to environmental regulations.
Professor Parmet concludes that while it may be difficult to document the tangible effects
of deconstitutionalization, the cumulative effect of these decisions is to take the focus off
government’s legitimate and affirmative responsibility to preserve civil society by protecting
public health. The states’ decisions to spend a great deal of money and control large swaths of
industrial activity are rationalized instead on the basis that they are supported by the majority of
the voters and should be scrutinized by the courts only where institutional rights are clearly
jeopardized or newly energized principles of federalism are compromised. This commentary
could as easily be applied to environmental law. Anchoring the constitutionality of
environmental statutes on the Commerce Clause also serves to deflect consideration of what
government should be expected to do for the people in an affirmative sense. As in the public
health context, judicial and legislative debates over the wisdom of environmental policy revolve
around the merits and downsides of the individual policy in financial terms—will it cost us too
much to clean up the air?—rather than the principle that communities should expect government
to preserve this essential natural resource without which a healthy life is impossible.
64

Rise and Fall, supra note 52, at 502.
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Like every scholar firmly anchored in the implications for her theories of current events,
Professor Parmet has noted the shocking implications of the tragedies that began on September
11, 2001 for public health constitutional doctrines.65 She suggests that these events should have
made clear to every observer that the federal government has a crucial role to play in protecting
public health from bio-terrorism and emerging threats like bird flu. In this new and fearful era,
all three branches of government have an unavoidable stake in removing the barriers between
state and federal responsibilities to protect public health. Similarly, the advent of climate change
demands a more flexible interpretation of constitutional intent than the Supreme Court has yet
realized.
B. The Federal Police Power
One of the most bizarre and troubling byproducts of the September 11, 2001 attacks was
the mailing of anthrax to the offices of Senator Thomas Daschle (D-ND) and NBC News anchor
Tom Brokaw.66 The Federal Bureau of Investigation later discovered that this act of terrorism
was almost certainly conducted by a mentally ill American who worked as a senior researcher in
a military laboratory at Fort Detrick in Frederick, Maryland.67 Regardless of its perpetrator,
foreign or domestic, the incident showcased the extraordinarily high expectations Americans
harbor toward the national government’s ability to protect people from such threats. Had the
anthrax spread, the federal government would have organized a coordinated response. Federal
officials would depend heavily on local hospitals, police departments, and emergency medical

65

Wendy E. Parmet, After September 11: Rethinking Public Health Federalism, J. OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS,
201-211 (2002).
66
David Johnston & Alison Mitchell, A Nation Challenged: The Widening Inquiry; Anthrax Mailed to Senate Is
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personnel, but they would be the ones held accountable for curtailing the spread of the dreadful
disease. Indeed, most people—especially the federal officials rushing to sit in the hot seat of
such crises (former Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge, the newly appointed chief of homeland
security for then President George W. Bush, dominated the airwaves in the wake of the crisis)—
would have considered anyone who questioned this preeminent role unpatriotic.
Despite this clear manifestation of national consensus on the federal government’s
obligation to exercise what the law has always described as “police powers,” we continue to
teach law students that only the states have this authority. As the anthrax episode illustrates, the
global challenges of the 21st century make this stubborn and constricted reading of the
Constitution very much against our national interests. Admittedly, the Supreme Court has never
hinted that the police power attributed to the states in its early jurisprudence is the kind of power
that should also be attributed to the federal government. On the other hand, it is virtually
impossible to imagine any mainstream participant in the national policy debate challenging the
proposition that the federal government must play the dominant role in preventing and
responding to a global pandemic like bird flu or to international threats like a bio-terrorism
attack. And, of course, the federal government has erected an elaborate bureaucratic
infrastructure to exercise its police powers (see, e.g., the National Institutes of Health, the
Department of Health and Human Services, and the Centers for Disease Control).
In the environmental context, the federal government has long dominated policy making
through a system that delegates authority to states that volunteer for the responsibility of
implementing federal rules. Among the strongest principles embodied in that system is that
federal standards set the floor for minimal protection of public health and the environment but
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that states can go further if they deem additional protections to be necessary. One statute, the
Clean Air Act, even goes so far as to allow California to regulate motor vehicles to require that
they emit less pollution both because the state has acute air quality problems and because it is
among the largest economies in the world. California must petition to get the EPA’s approval of
these more stringent motor vehicle standards, and other states may follow its lead. All of these
provisions mean that states can and have “burdened” interstate commerce with more protective
standards on the rationale that people think of the entire system of law as providing protective
legal tools than as enabling the free flow of economic transactions.
The principle that states can be more protective is not seriously in question. California,
for example, has charged ahead on the regulation motor vehicle emissions for public health
purposes, winning as many as 50 approvals from the EPA to impose more stringent standards.
But this consensus is beginning to unravel in the climate change context, with many large fossil
fuel producers and users demanding preemption of state authority to curb greenhouse gases. 68
Ironically, the most prominent argument they made is that the federal government has superior
ability to combat this global crisis, which threatens both public health and natural resources. 69
While I do not agree with the next step of this argument—that states should be excluded from
governmental efforts to control climate change70--its proponents, which are among the largest
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companies in the world, clearly have acknowledged that much more than the free flow of
interstate commerce is at stake. Instead, federal control is viewed as important in ensuring that
the United States holds its own in negotiating with the rest of the world over these reductions.
Clearly, then, devotion to the Commerce Clause as the source of environmental law is under
active reconsideration in the climate change context.
Finally, as daunting as the climate change problem appears to be, other global issues will
soon confront the federal government, lending further urgency to the search for a new
constitutional framework for the American effort to persuade other countries to diminish their
contribution to the global cycles of pollution that threaten the quality of our domestic
environment. As just one example, scientists have discovered that much of the particulate
pollution that falls in Los Angeles originated in China.71
C. Taxing and Spending
Pouring the hopes for the future of environmental law into the as-yet unused chalice of
the General Welfare Clause is likely to result in overflow, or at the very least a tight fit, unless
one specific doctrinal problem is addressed. The Supreme Court held in United States v. Butler
that the power to provide for the general welfare is directly tied to congressional taxing and
spending authority. 72

The 1936 case involved agricultural subsidies designed to control crop

prices. The Supreme Court struck down the program because it addressed “agricultural
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production,” a “purely local” industry that only the states were empowered to address.73 This
aspect of the case is no longer good law given the dramatic expansion of federal Commerce
Clause authority discussed earlier.74 More significantly, however, the Court also held that the
national government’s power to provide for the general welfare is conditioned upon its
simultaneous exercise of the power to tax to and spend, and this rule remains good law.75 Most
significantly, the Court stated that the “the power of Congress to authorize expenditures is not
limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.”76 Accordingly, if
Congress is willing to put its money where its mouth is, whether or not it has the power to
legislate under the Commerce Clause, it is free to create programs that promote its perception of
what is needed to provide for the general welfare.
The federal government spends considerable sums each year to manage federal lands,
deploying park rangers and fire-fighting teams, maintaining the national parks, securing the
borders from private sector incursions, building roads, supervising the preservation of wildlife,
etc. These substantial financial commitments are probably sufficient to satisfy the Butler test as
applied to the core requirements of the National Environmental Legacy Act (NELA), which
would mandate the analysis of any major federal action that could affect the long-term
sustainability of natural resources located on federally owned lands. However, as discussed at
the outset, NELA would also require that action be abandoned or modified if the analysis showed
that it would threaten long-term sustainability of federally owned natural resources. The power
to block such actions should reasonably extend to actions that take place on privately owned land
73
74
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if they would have comparable effects. Opponents of NELA could argue that unless the federal
government subsidized the costs of these consequences, the new law should be read as purely
regulatory with respect to private conduct, and therefore not involving the exercise of taxing or
spending authority. Any number of other legislative formulations that seek to protect future
generations could raise comparable questions.
Article I, Section 8 concludes that Congress has the power:
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
The courts have given Congress wide latitude in designing taxes and spending (e.g., state grants
in aid) to include prescriptions that affect behavior of either the taxpayer or the recipient of
federal largesse.77 How far they would defer in cases where spending is accompanied by
regulation that affects the conduct of private parties is obviously an issue that must be resolved if
and when we make the shift in constitutional doctrine. Supporters of NELA and similar next
generation proposals would urge the most generous leeway, pointing out the very large sums the
federal government is spending—and the even larger sums it would be required to spend—if
these prohibited actions continued.
Putting these arguments together, then, the strong advantages of grounding the protection
of public health and natural resources in the concept of the government’s affirmative
responsibilities to safeguard the quality of life in a civil society would best be served by
recognition of a federal police power anchored on the General Welfare Clause. There remains
the question of whether this power, or authority, can traverse the long distance to becoming a
77
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judicial enforceable right. For the foreseeable future, as explained in the next section, I think it
cannot. The proposition that the Constitution grants Congress authority to provide for the
general welfare of the people is not based on any notion that the people, or nature for that matter,
have a judicially enforceable “right” to such protection. If the people are not satisfied with how
Congress carries out this mission, their remedy is at the ballot box, not in the courts.
Part V: The Affirmative Constitution
A. Negative Verus Affirmative Rights
Mid-way through the Reagan Administration, long-simmering tensions among
constitutional experts erupted into public view. The conflict, which is ongoing, pits
conservatives who view the Constitution as primarily important for the “negative” rights it
affords individuals against liberals who read “affirmative” rights into the text. 78 A full
exposition of this extensive debate is beyond the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, locating
my admittedly ambitious theory on the progressive end of this evolving constitutional
scholarship should help readers evaluate it further.
The debate began in 1985 when then Attorney General Edwin Meese gave a speech to the
American Bar Association articulating the theory of “originalism,” an approach to interpreting
the Constitution that views the Constitution as an immutable, transcendent law that is not subject
to evolving, arguably inconsistent interpretations. 79 Unless a proponent of a constitutional
theory can provide substantial evidence that the Framers of the document intended for it to be
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read the way they think we should read it today, the theory is rejected. Judges should not
substitute their personal biases or policy choices for a careful study of what the Constitution’s
Framers had in mind.
Conservative commentators on the bench and in academia have embraced the doctrine,
and it has become a central tenet for at least four Supreme Court Justices (Alito, Roberts, Scalia,
Thomas), as well as countless judges in the lower courts. Originalism has prompted
conservatives--and liberals seeking to persuade conservative judges and policymakers--to search
through the documents contemporary to the Constitution, especially the Federalist Papers, as
well as the history books to support claims that the Framers in their wisdom intended the result
they advocate. Professor Parmet’s careful exposition of the Framers’ awareness of
Massachusetts vaccine laws, discussed earlier, is an example of this kind of analysis.80
Supreme Court Justice William Brennan responded to General Meese in a speech at
Georgetown University a few months later:
We current Justices read the Constitution in the only way that we can: as Twentieth
Century Americans. We look to the history of the time of framing and to the intervening
history of interpretation. But the ultimate question must be, what do the words of the text
mean in our time. For the genius of the Constitution rests not in static meaning it might
have had in a world that is dead and gone but in the adaptability of its great principles to
cope with current problems and current needs. 81
His views have been reiterated by progressive or liberal academics and judges, perhaps most
notably by Justice Stephen Breyer in his 2005 book Active Liberty Interpreting, Our Democratic
Constitution.82 Under this alternative view, the Constitution establishes a framework for the

80

Health Care and the Constitution, supra note 52.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech to the text and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown University,
Washington, D.C. Oct. 12, 1985, available at http://ww.fed-soc.org/resources/id.50/default.asp.
82
STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY, INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005).
81

36

Beyond Environmental Law: Policy Proposals for a Better Environmental Future, Alyson Flournoy and David
Driesen, eds. (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2010)
Chapter: The Constitution and Our Debt to the Future
April 11, 2009
Copyright 2009 by Rena Steinzor--Please do not cite, quote, or copy without express permission of author.

most successful system of government in human history, but its statement of generalized
principles must be interpreted in a flexible way to resolve challenges that the Framers could not
have anticipated. The most important guidance for judges is their informed consideration of the
shifting values shared by the American public, along with the consistent commitment to the
protection of minority rights that motivated the Framers to establish a constitutional republic
rather than a direct democracy.
Not surprisingly, because these discussions have revolved around judicial interpretations
of the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, they have focused on
government’s obligations to avoid interfering with individual autonomy (or negative rights), as
opposed to its responsibility to provide benefits for the people (or affirmative rights). For
example, challenges to the exercise of state police powers are often brought by individuals
placed under quarantine or compelled to undergo vaccination.83 Judicial efforts to balance the
needs of the community against the Bill of Rights did not substantially diminish the notion that
the states had substantial discretion to do what was necessary to protect the general public.84 A
smattering of scholars have argued for the recognition of affirmative rights to fundamental needs
like health care but have encountered heavy resistance from the academic establishment and the
courts.85
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The landmark case is DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,86
which concerned the tragic story of four-year-old Joshua DeShaney who was so severely beaten
by his father that he became profoundly retarded. The lawsuit was brought by his mother, who
asserted that county authorities had twice returned Joshua to the custody of his father despite
their awareness that Joshua was victim of repeated, severe physical abuse in his father’s house.
These actions violated Joshua’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and entitled him to
recovery under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the civil rights statute granting a cause of action against
government officials who act outside the scope of their authority. Lower courts had rejected
these claims. However, the Third Circuit held in a similar case that once a state or local
government learns of abuse, and undertakes to protect a child from such danger, it forms a
special relation that imposes an “affirmative constitutional duty” to provide adequate
protection.87 Six state attorneys general, the National Association of Counties, and the National
School Boards Association filed amicus briefs in the DeShaney case, warning of the floodgates
that would open if the Court put a foot wrong by suggesting that the states assumed an obligation
to keep people like Joshua safe whenever the social service systems produced decisions about
their lives. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address this conflict in the circuits.
Acknowledging that the facts of the case elicited “natural sympathy,” the majority noted
that “before yielding to that impulse, it is well to remember once again that the harm was
inflicted not by the State of Wisconsin, but by Joshua’s father.”88 Because the county had no
“constitutional duty” to protect Joshua, its failure to do so, “although calamitous in hindsight,” is
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not a violation of the Due Process Clause.89 Justice Brennan, writing in dissent for Justices
Marshall and Blackmun, significantly did not challenge the majority’s view that “the Due
Process Clause as construed by our prior cases creates no right to basic government services.”90
But, he added, Joshua’s case did not present that question. Rather, Joshua suffered grave injury
after the county had already taken action on more than one occasion to place the small child
under the control of his father, thereby subjecting him to the possibility of abuse. If their actions
were arbitrary, then Joshua and his mother should recover, and the case should be remanded to
the trial court for examination of this issue. Given the extreme circumstances of the case, and
the enormous pressure state and local governments can exert on courts by warning of the
unforeseen consequences of creating affirmative rights, it is difficult to imagine that a majority
of the Court would reverse this position any time soon.
Conditioning the argument for recognition of a federal police power on the
acknowledgment that the Constitution grants Congress authority to take action but does not
confer on individual citizens a judicially enforceable right to such protections has the great
advantage of neutralizing a central assertion of the originalists. It would be a bad thing if
unelected federal judges undertook the difficult job of deciding when and how to deploy the
government’s limited resources to combat such extensive threats. However, as Professor Robin
West has argued persuasively in other contexts, the notion that judges have the exclusive
prerogative to define the obligations of government is one of the most unfortunate results of a
deeply conservative trend in legal scholarship.91
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B.

The Aspirational Constitution

If judges are not the sole source of constitutional interpretation and should not control—
literally or by implication—how other branches read its affirmative grants of authority, how
should Congress interpret its responsibilities under the General Welfare Clause? Professor West
has argued persuasively that the Constitution creates positive obligations to pass laws that will
protect citizens against environmental threats.92 She points to the writings of Thomas Hobbes,
John Locke, Thomas Paine, and, more recently, John Rawls in defining the nature and scope of
those responsibilities. She accepts the DeShaney holding as definitive at the same time that she
dismisses it as irrelevant to Congress’ quest to define its affirmative role.
Professor West further argues that the American people believe in the idea that Congress
has affirmative duties, and are far more concerned about its failure to carry out those duties than
they are about the government’s interference with the individual rights that so preoccupy
constitutional scholars:
The worry increasingly voiced by American citizens, particularly in Katrina’s wake, is
that our domestic politics and the state that is its product have become too wan, not too
voracious, even as our foreign policies have become monstrously outsized. Our shrunken
state, incapable of either preparing for or mounting an adequate response to a hurricane,
incapable of repairing deteriorating bridges or crumbling schools, incapable of
responding to public health crises or to a dangerously warming climate, seems, to many
of our co-citizens, to be in breach of the most basic, fundamental duties central to a
sensible construal of virtually any social compact. Thus, where lawyers look at our
government and see the ‘empire of force’ of which Weil spoke, in violation of any
number of constitutional norms, many of our co-citizens see, at best, sloth – an empire
that is failing or willfully refusing to live up to its most basic obligations.93
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Time will tell whether a Democratic Congress and the Obama Administration will
respond to these deep-seated perceptions of government inadequacies or whether they will shrink
from these challenges in the face of strident charges that protections will cost too much and will
drown our children in debt. It is no small irony that with respect to the breakthrough proposals
discussed in this chapter and this book, nothing less than our children’s future is on the line.
Consistency may be the hobgoblin of a small mind, but the profound inconsistencies between
these arguments should feature prominently in future debates. We may think we cannot afford to
deal with climate change and sustainability but our children certainly will not be able to afford
these problems if we do not.
VI.

Conclusion
Despite their implicit commitment to precedent and a stable interpretation of the

Constitution, General Meese and other originalists would be compelled to acknowledge that the
Supreme Court has made some stunning, 180-degree turns in its history. In 1896, Plessy v.
Ferguson upheld the “separate but equal” doctrine in the context of railway travel,94 only to
rectify this disgrace 58 years later in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County,
Kansas.95 Yet the Constitution that existed in 1896 was the same as the Constitution that existed
in 1954. What had changed were the hearts, minds, and perceived social imperatives of the
justices appointed to safeguard it. At this moment on earth, with the planet’s future literally
hanging in the balance, it may be time for a similar Constitutional moment.
If we stick with Commerce Clause analysis, giving economists free rein to forecast future
markets in commodities like clean air and clean water, we can justify incremental but significant
94
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changes. The problem with these projections is that the economic value of natural resources left
in trust for future generations diminishes to zero over time. Consequently, traditional economic
analysis militates against preserving environmental quality for future generations. Supporters of
a National Environmental Legacy Act and similar proposals will seldom win a numbers game
unless they limit their preservation goals to a severely constrained short-term.
If, on the other hand, we read the Constitution as embodying additional values beyond
preservation of the marketplace, the horizon of change may well be extended beyond where we
already see. The National Environmental Legacy Act and similar breakthrough laws, all of
which are necessary to avert the worst consequences of climate change, could be based on the
principle of preserving the general welfare that was embraced by the Framers and remains
central to Americans’ understanding of the rule of law today. Had the justices serving on the
Supreme Court in the post-industrialization era been less timid, or less focused on shielding the
marketplace from government interference, they might well have considered whether the
Constitution’s text provided additional authority to protect public health, safety, and the
environment.
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